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Abstract 
Low returns on financial assets and increasing longevity mean saving for retirement is becoming more 
challenging than it has been in the past. Generations retiring in the near term (boomers) face increased 
longevity, but have lived through periods with strong market returns boosting their assets, and many also 
have DB entitlements. Younger generations also face increasing longevity, and in addition are likely to 
earn much lower investment returns on their retirement assets and few have DB. The challenge for them 
is tougher. We model the likely outcomes for different cohorts under scenarios for savings behavior, 
investment returns and life expectancy. We take account of likely pillar one entitlements and varying 
replacement rate requirements and expected longevity in different demographic and income groups. We 
show that younger generations do face substantial challenges, but there are plausible courses of action 
involving increased contributions and delayed or partial retirement that can provide reasonable income 
replacement rates in retirement. We map out the steps that the retirement industry (government, 
employers, financial services providers) needs to take to support people in following these courses of 
action, such as providing more flexibility over social security. 
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Chapter 5
Investing for Retirement in a Low Returns
Environment: Making the Right Decisions
to Make the Money Last
Catherine Reilly and Alistair Byrne
At the same time that longevity has been increasing, expected investment
returns have fallen below historical levels. Figure 5.1 shows Society of Pro-
fessional Forecasters’ estimates of ten-year real returns on key US assets
classes, with forecasts made from 1992 to 2017. Expected bill rates, bond
returns, and equities returns are all signiﬁcantly lower now than in the
recent decade. In a lower return environment, markets do less of the work
for savers, so contributions need to be higher instead. For Baby Boomers
who have enjoyed good returns for most of their careers, this will have little
impact. For younger individuals, however, lower future returns are a more
signiﬁcant drag on retirement income prospects.
How to Reach Target Replacement Rates
with Deﬁned Contribution Plans
Approach and methodology. One goal of this chapter is to provide partici-
pants, plan sponsors, and policymakers with simple guidelines on the strat-
egies that participants can employ to have enough money available in
retirement. It seems self-evident that people should save more and expect
to work for longer, but how much more do they need to save and at what age
should they aspire to retire? The answers to these questions may be different
depending on the participant’s current age and previous contribution
history. Furthermore, because the social security replacement rate varies
depending on income level, we also need to take this into consideration.
To do so, we ﬁrst look at the replacement rate that different age cohorts
can expect from their deﬁned contribution (DC) savings. We use identical
savings assumptions, so that any differences in outcomes between cohorts
are due purely to differences in market returns. We then study the impact
that increasing the savings rate or postponing retirement would have on
retirement readiness for the different age cohorts. Unsurprisingly, we ﬁnd
that the outlook for younger generations is considerably more challenging
than for older generations who have beneﬁted from stronger historical
returns. Of course, in addition to their DC savings, most participants will
also receive income from social security in retirement and some will also
have income from deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) plans.
Second, we investigate the outlook for different income groups, taking
into account both differences in life expectancy and social security replace-
ment rates. Primarily due to the progressive nature of social security, low
income cohorts will need lower DC savings rates to achieve retirement
readiness than will higher earning cohorts. Finally, we study the strategies
that late starters (i.e., 45- and 55-year-old participants without accumulated
savings balances) can employ to improve their ability to retire in comfort. By
employing aggressive savings rates (over 15 percent) and working to 70 or
beyond, these groups are likely to achieve reasonable retirement outcomes.
Challenges for different age cohorts. To calculate outcomes by cohorts, we
assume that all the individuals invest in identical portfolios consisting of
80 percent S&P500 stocks and 20 percent US government bonds through-
out their working lives. While this portfolio is undeniably simpliﬁed and may
not be the investment vehicle of choice for current cohorts, we choose it
because something like it has been available to all the different cohorts
(unlike e.g., target date funds, ﬁrst launched in the mid-1990s). This also
provides a reasonable approximation of the average equity/bond split of a
target date fund during the accumulation phase. We assume that all
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Figure 5.1. Ten-year expected returns from the Society of Professional Forecasters
Note: Returns are deﬂated with Survey of Professional Forecasters’ long-run consumer price
index inﬂation forecast.
Source: Williams (2017).
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participants join the plan at the age of 22 and invest the same amount of
their salary (in our base case, 9 percent) in the portfolio, and they also
experience the same nominal wage growth (2 percent per annum) through-
out their careers. The nine-percent contribution rate is our base case
because the median employee contribution rate is about six percent and
the most common employer matching contribution is three percent
(Vanguard 2016). For older participants, their returns are based mainly
on realized historical returns; for younger participants, their portfolio
growth is based mainly on forecasted future returns based on Monte Carlo
simulations using asset class return forecasts from State Street Global
Advisors’ Investment Solutions Group. We take into account that life expect-
ancy will continue to rise, so that someone who is now 25 years old will have
higher life expectancy at age 65 than someone now 60 years old. We
calculate the replacement rate that each age cohort can expect at retire-
ment, based on the returns that their portfolios have delivered over their
savings periods and their life expectancies at retirement.
We show that there is wide variation in outcomes by cohort (see Figure 5.2).
A hypothetical individual currently 60 years old and who retires at age 65,
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
350%
400%
450%
500%
65 70 75
Re
pl
ac
em
en
t R
at
e
Retirement Age
60 45 25
Figure 5.2. Expected replacement rate by current age of participant and retirement
age, 9 percent contribution rate
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Investment Security Group (ISG) asset class forecasts
and UN population projections. The drawdown rate assumes that 90 percent of the assets will
last until at least ﬁve years beyond median life expectancy for each cohort (equivalent to
approximately the 75th percentile).
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having been saving since age 22, could expect to achieve a 211-percent
replacement rate from his DC savings alone. In addition, he can expect to
receive social security and may well have some DB beneﬁts as well. (While few
60-year-olds may have been in a DC plan since the age of 22, they could have
made contributions to a retirement savings account by themselves.) By con-
trast, an individual currently 25 years old and who employs the same saving
strategy could expect to achieve a 27-percent replacement rate if he was to
retire at age 65. Furthermore, the younger individual is unlikely to have any
DB entitlements and faces more uncertainty regarding the amount of social
security that he will receive. A 45-year-old individual can expect better out-
comes than the 25-year-old but is also clearly disadvantaged compared to the
60-year-old.
Due to these lower expected returns, younger cohorts are clearly at a
disadvantage to older workers. The most obvious tactics that younger work-
ers could adopt to improve their situation are to contribute more and to
work for longer. Yet the real questions is: how much more and how much
longer? We also seek combinations that are feasible: savings rates that are
affordable, and working patterns that are manageable.
For example, let us assume that our worker aspires to achieve a 40-percent
replacement rate from his DC plan (while relying on social security and other
sources of income for the rest of his retirement income). Depending on his
desired retirement age, he will have a menu of action plans to choose from
(here, we assume in all cases that he employs the same savings rate through-
out his working life). A 25-year-old could reach a 40-percent replacement rate
by contributing about 13.5 percent and working until age 65; by contributing
slightly above 10 percent and working to age 70, or by contributing about
7 percent and working to age 75 (see Table 5.1 below). The 35- and 45-year-
olds beneﬁt from stronger historical returns, so they can achieve the target
replacement rate at slightly lower contribution rates.
It is encouraging to see that these contribution rates seem feasible. Yet it
is important to note that this assumes consistent savings behavior during
the entire working life, no career breaks, and no leakage from retirement
savings. In fact, however, leakage can be a signiﬁcant drag on savings
accumulation (Munnell and Webb 2015). Moreover, those who start to
save later or aspire to retire earlier will require higher savings rates. In
sum, ﬁnancial advisers’ often-quoted rule of thumb of 12–15 percent of
income seems surprisingly realistic (Munnell et al. 2014).
Challenges for computations by income: differences in life-expectancy and
social security replacement rates. Participant income levels are relevant to
our computations for reasons over and above the fact that those with more
income will be more able to save. First, public social security or pension
beneﬁts tend to be (fairly) ﬂat, meaning that replacement rates from state
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pensions are higher in percentage terms for lower earners. Second, life
expectancies are correlated with income levels, in that higher earners
tend to live longer. Both factors will inﬂuence our retirement income
calculations.
An often-cited rule of thumb suggests a two-thirds or 70 percent income
replacement target, but this is rather imprecise. In reality, the required
replacement rate depends on a variety of factors including household size,
home equity, region, and so on (MacDonald et al. 2016). Broadly speaking,
a lower earner will need a higher replacement rate in percentage terms (to
cover essential expenditures) compared to a higher earner, though the
latter may have higher aspirations.
There will also be differences in social security entitlements and other
sources of income. Lower-paid individuals are likely to receive relatively high
replacement rates (in percentage terms) from social security. Nevertheless,
percentages can be misleading, as people on very low incomes may need
close to a 100-percent replacement rate simply to meet their basic needs,
especially if they have few other ﬁnancial resources. Those on lower incomes
TABLE . Expected replacement rate by retirement age
and contribution rate
25-year-olds Retirement age
Contribution rate (%) 65 (%) 70 (%) 75 (%)
3 9 13 18
6 18 26 35
9 27 38 53
12 36 51 71
15 45 64 89
35-year-olds
3 11 15 22
6 22 31 44
9 33 46 66
12 44 62 88
15 55 77 110
45-year-olds
3 15 21 30
6 31 43 60
9 46 64 90
12 62 86 120
15 77 107 150
Notes: The drawdown rate assumes a 90% probability that the assets
will last until at least ﬁve years beyond median life-expectancy for
each cohort (equivalent to approximately the 75th percentile).
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Investment Security Group
(ISG) asset class forecasts and UN population projections.
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also typically have poorer health and lower life expectancies, reducing
their ability to extend their working life. Indeed only about 30 percent of
males in the lowest income quintile are still in full-time employment at age
60, compared with almost 80 percent in the highest income quintile
(Gorodnichenko et al. 2013). Yet this also reduces the number of years in
retirement that lower-income persons need to fund.
Higher-income individuals will receive considerably lower replacement
rates from social security, but they are more likely to be able to manage with
the often-quoted 70-percent replacement rate or even less. They are also
more likely to own their own homes and have other sources of income in
addition to social security. Extending their working lives may also be more
feasible, and indeed more necessary, since their higher life expectancies
mean that they will have a longer retirement period to fund. In order to
achieve a given replacement rate target, higher earners must also generate a
higher replacement rate from their DC savings. Table 5.2 shows social
security replacement rates by income levels for individuals retiring either
at age 65 or 70 (the latter being the current maximum age for claiming
social security). It illustrates the progressive nature of social security bene-
ﬁts. For example, a low earner can expect a 49-percent replacement rate
from age 65, whereas someone earning at the contribution cap would have a
replacement rate of only 24 percent at that age.
There is also substantial evidence that high-income individuals have
longer life expectancies than the lower-income groups (see Table 5.3).
This disparity has risen for several decades, and adding race and education
to the computation makes the disparity even more striking. The life expect-
ancy for white American males with 16 years or more of schooling in 2008
was 14.2 years more than for black American male with fewer than 12 years
of education (Olshansky et al. 2012).
Accordingly, higher earners also expect to spend a longer period in
retirement, while receiving a lower replacement rate from social security.
TABLE . US social security replacement rates by income level and
retirement age
Earnings group (2014) Ending salary (2014, $) Retirement age
65 (%) 70 (%)
Low 21,176 49.0 60.8
Medium 47,125 36.3 45.0
High 75,393 30.1 37.3
Max 114,391 23.9 29.6
Note: Beneﬁt adjustments calculated for persons born in 1960 or later.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on social security replacement rate data
consistent with Ofﬁce of the Chief Actuary (2014).
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This means that in order to achieve a given target replacement rate, higher
earners must save a higher proportion of their incomes than low-income
earners, or live on relatively less in retirement.
In our next round of calculations, we examine the case of a 25-year-old at
the start of their career. We add our DC replacement rate calculations to the
expected social security replacement rates for different income cohorts to
assess how much individuals in different income cohorts would need to
save in order to achieve a target income replacement rate when retiring at
age 65 or 70.
To illustrate, we assume that all households target a 70-percent replace-
ment rate at retirement. As Figure 5.3 shows, themix of DC savings and social
security that provides this replacement rate varies by income group. A low
earner retiring at age 70 would be able to rely entirely on social security to
provide a 70-percent replacement rate, whereas a maximum earner retiring
at 65 would need to generate a 46-percent replacement rate from his DC
savings. The maximum earner here is an individual earning the maximum
wage on which social security contributions are paid (currently $127,000);
individuals earning higher salaries will need to generate an even higher
proportion of retirement income from their DC savings.
Moreover, higher earners must save considerably higher shares of their
salaries than do the low earners. If we exclude the very lowest income group,
people aspiring to retire at age 65 should save between 11 and 15 percent of
their salary; those planning to defer retirement until 70 should save between
four and eight percent (see Figure 5.4).
Two interesting implications arise from this analysis. First, even in the
low return environment, people who save systematically for retirement
should be well equipped to retire even at fairly modest deferral rates (we
reiterate that these are total savings rates including an employer matching
contributions). Participants wishing to retire at 65 need to save almost twice
TABLE . Difference in life expectancy for male Social Security-
covered workers, by age between selected earnings groups for the
period 1999–2000 (in years) at different ages between top and bottom
income quartiles
Top half minus bottom half Top quarter minus bottom quarter
60 2.6 3.3
65 1.9 2.3
70 1.2 1.3
75 0.5 0.3
80 0 0.4
85 0.4 0.9
Source: Waldron (2007).
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as much of their salary as those planning to retire at 70. Our model assumes
that participants keep the same 80/20 portfolio until retirement; this is
more aggressive than most people are likely to do, and may slightly overstate
the investment gains during the last years of working life. Accordingly, these
should be interpreted as minimums rather than recommended rates. Yet
this does not change the conclusion that postponing retirement has a very
positive impact on retirement readiness, not least through its impact on the
replacement rate offered by social security.
Second, because the low earners receive a high replacement rate from
social security, they only need to save a fairly small proportion of their
salaries. If they are able to work until age 70, they may not need to save
much at all. This has interesting implications for the potential introduction
of automatic enrollment schemes targeted at uncovered employees, such as
state plans in the United States (see Gale and John’s chapter in this volume)
or automatic enrollment in the United Kingdom. Employees at the lower
end of the earnings spectrum are also less likely to be offered retirement
plans by their employers than those at the higher end, and automatic
enrollment plans often have quite modest total contribution rates (a total
rate of 8 percent in the United Kingdom, while the Oregon State plan
targets at 6 percent). These rates are likely to be inadequate for higher
earners, but as we have demonstrated, they are probably ample for the low
paid. Requiring people on low incomes to save more could be counter-
productive, as it may lead them to opt out altogether. Since optimal savings
rates will differ by earning levels, one potential solution could be to have
different automatic enrollment rates for employees by income level. Alter-
natively, communication and engagement could focus on encouraging
higher earners to save more, though plan sponsors will need to be aware
of the powerful inﬂuence of inertia in preventing action.
Challenges for late starters. In the previous section, we showed that partici-
pants who systematically save for retirement throughout their careers can
reach reasonable outcomes with fairly low savings rates, despite the low
expected market returns. Yet many people reach middle age without having
saved signiﬁcant amounts for retirement. What strategies can these individ-
uals employ to maximize their chances of attaining ﬁnancial security in
retirement?
We study a 45-year-old and a 55-year-old who start saving for retirement,
and ﬁrst evaluate the impact of different contribution rates (10, 15, 20, and
25 percent) and alternative retirement ages. We then study how working
part time in retirement (from 65 to 70 or from 70 to 75) could affect
expected replacement rates. For such late starters, we assume that they
make their contributions to an age-appropriate target date fund. Again,
assumed investment returns are based on State Street Global Advisors’
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asset class return forecasts, and in retirement, the same drawdown rates are
used as in the previous section.
Participants who start the retirement saving journey late do face more
challenges, yet they can also signiﬁcantly improve their retirement readiness
with a disciplined approach to saving and by postponing retirement. Figure 5.5
shows the DC replacement rates that an individual starting to save at age 45 or
55 can expect to achieve, depending on his contribution rate and retirement
age. Unsurprisingly, even at these relatively high contribution rates, outcomes
are considerably poorer than for early starters. Previously we showed the
combinations of contribution rate and retirement age, that would lead to a
40-percent DC replacement rate. Here, by contrast, we see that even a
20-percent contribution rate and working until age 70 provides only a fraction
of this target.
Figure 5.6 shows expected total replacement rates for late starters at
different contribution rates, including social security. The ﬁrst calculation
assumes a medium earner who saves 15 percent and retires at age 65. He can
expect a replacement rate of just over 50 percent; by delaying retirement to
age 70, he could achieve a total replacement rate of 70 percent. Those on
higher salaries will have lower social security replacement rates at all ages.
Potential policy reforms. As evident, postponing retirement is an extremely
powerful tool for improving retirement outcomes. In fact, retiring at age 70
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or even 75 would improve retirement readiness for all cohorts, but particu-
larly for late starters and higher earners. Though some people may not
be physically able to work full time that late, part-time work may be feasible
for many.
Another consideration is that social security payments currently start at
the latest at age 70, and there is no option for ‘partial retirement.’ One
alternative policy would be to allow individuals to take out partial social
security beneﬁts rather than obliging them to always take the full
beneﬁt. For example, in Sweden, people who have reached the minimum
age of eligibility for social security (62) can take a 25 percent, 50 percent,
75 percent, or 100 percent beneﬁt, and modify this percentage when desired
at an actuarially fair rate. There is also no maximum age by which full
payments must start (Pensions Myndigheten 2016). Such a ﬂexible option
could be particularly useful for people who start saving for retirement later
in life.
Another option would be to give people a choice to defer the start of
social security beneﬁts beyond age 70, to make the most efﬁcient use of its
cost-efﬁcient longevity insurance. This would make it possible to use social
security as a longevity backstop, providing the main source of income in late
life, rather than a steady source of income throughout retirement. For
example, in Australia, eligibility for the Age Pension is based on an asset
test (reassessed annually) rather than retirees’ age. People are not eligible
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Figure 5.6. Expected total replacement rate for a medium earner who started saving
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Source: Authors’ calculations.
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for the Age Pension until they have drawn their assets down to a minimum
level, after which they receive the ﬂat rate Age Pension for the rest of their
lives. Johnson (2016) suggests a similar modiﬁcation to the UK State Pension,
postponing the start of payments to age 80 but doubling the payment.
If it were possible to defer social security payments until age 75 at an
actuarially fair rate, this would substantially increase replacement rates.
Some people might ﬁnd it preferable to run down their DC balances ﬁrst,
in order to maximize the beneﬁt from social security by claiming at a later
date. The ability to postpone payments and receive higher beneﬁts for a
shorter period could be particularly valuable for higher earners, who would
now actually receive meaningful income and valuable longevity insurance
from social security. Table 5.4 calculates the social security replacement
rate for starting payments at age 75 by assuming that this would lead to
the same increase as deferring from 65 to 70. As a matter of fact, this
understates the actuarially fair increase, as mortality credits would accumu-
late faster between open 70 and 75 than between 65 and 70. Nevertheless, a
ﬂat rate has the beneﬁt of simplicity and is used in a number of countries.
For example, the UK uses a ﬂat rate increase of 5.8 percent per annum for
deferring the state pension.
Another policy alternative would be to offer people a lump sum rather
than a higher annuity payment as a means to encourage people to defer
retirement. Maurer et al. (2016) found that offering a lump sum incentive
rather than a higher monthly payment after the Early Retirement Age (62)
induced people to voluntarily claim 6–8 months later that they otherwise
would. In essence, offering lump sum incentives builds on the behavioral
reluctance of people to annuitize. The fact that those who currently claim at
the youngest ages were also most responsive to the lump sum offer indicates
TABLE . How would allowing deferral to age 75 affect social
security replacement rates for different income cohorts?
Income level Claiming age
65 70 75
Low 49% 70% 100%
Medium 36% 52% 74%
High 30% 43% 62%
Max 24% 34% 49%
Note: For simplicity we have adjusted the beneﬁt to age 75 using the
same increase as from age 65 to 70; in reality, the actuarially fair
adjustment would be higher, as mortality credits would accrue more
rapidly at more advanced ages.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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that this could be an effective incentive, particularly for the less ﬁnancially
literate sections of the population. Maurer et al. (2017) also found that lump
sums of 85–90 percent of the actuarially fair amount were still effective in
encouraging later claiming.
As the population approaching retirement is becoming increasingly het-
erogeneous, it may also be necessary to offer different incentive structures
for different groups. For example, offering lump sum incentives could be an
effective and equitable way of encouraging lower earners to defer claiming
social security. As lower earners have lower life expectancies, they expect to
derive less beneﬁt from deferring social security for a higher payment than
higher earners. Offering them a lump sum would allow them to reap the full
beneﬁt of deferring retirement.
We have also modeled what would happen if employees had the option of
taking out 50 percent social security at ages 65 or 70. For those who work
part time from 65 to 70, we calculate the social security beneﬁt by assuming
that at age 65 they receive 50 percent of the beneﬁt payable at 65; from
age 70, they receive 50 percent of the beneﬁt payable at 65 and 50 percent of
the beneﬁt payable at age 70. We follow an equivalent procedure for those
who work part time from 70 to 75. We model the income stream that they
would receive by subtracting the DC contribution rate from the wage
income (hence the 85-percent replacement rate while in full time work).
Figure 5.7 shows that for the participant who started saving at age 45,
working part time in retirement until age 70 would get him to a replacement
rate slightly higher than 60 percent. While this may not be optimal, it is still a
10-percentage-point improvement compared to completely retiring at age
65 (Figure 5.6). The participant who did not start saving until age 55 only
achieves a 55-percent replacement rate because of his limited DC savings
(Figure 5.8).
Late starters aiming for higher replacement rates could also beneﬁt from
working part time from 70 to 75, as they would reap the beneﬁt of higher
social security payments and a longer savings period (Figures 5.9 and 5.10).
The income stream in these calculations is rather uneven; one solution
would be to start drawing down some DC savings at age 70 to generate a
smoother income stream.
This hypothetical delayed social security payment is not currently avail-
able, yet the simulations illustrate how powerful delaying retirement and the
start of social security payments can be. Even with the current system, it can
be beneﬁcial for employees with limited savings to use their DC balances to
delay taking social security as long as possible, rather than to use them to
supplement their social security payments. Offering more ﬂexibility to defer
social security payments could further enhance the value of this beneﬁt and
allow individuals to optimize the value of their DC savings.
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Figure 5.7. Income stream for a medium earner participant who started saving at
age 45 at 15 percent, who works halftime and takes half his social security between
65 and 70 years old
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 5.8. Income stream for a medium earner participant who started saving at
age 55 at 15 percent, who works halftime and takes half his social security between
65 and 70 years old
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 5.9. Income stream for a medium income participant who started saving
at age 45 at 15 percent, who works halftime and takes half his social security between
70 and 75 years old
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 5.10. Income stream for a medium income participant who started saving
at age 55 at 15 percent, who works halftime and takes half his social security between
70 and 75 years old
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Altering the Choice Environment
Incentives for saving. These approaches require individuals to save consist-
ently over their working lives, and there is a range of behavioral interventions
(‘nudges’) that can help people save more to generate better replacement
rates. It is now fairly well established that automatic enrollment can boost
pension participation rates. Automatic enrollment is now mandated in the
UK and achieving opt outs of only around 5–15 percent (Department for
Work and Pensions 2014). Many large US DC plans also use automatic
enrollment (Vanguard 2016) and the approach is under consideration for
improving participation in Ireland. Australia and Chile go even further with
compulsory retirement plan participation for all employees.
It has also been shown that ‘save more tomorrow’ approaches—involving
automatically escalating contribution rates—can be effective in boosting
contribution rates over time (Benartzi and Thaler 2007). This can allow
for participants to be introduced to retirement saving at a low rate, avoiding
adverse reaction to reductions in take-home pay, before being raised to the
long-term required levels. This approach is in use in a growing number of
large US plans (Vanguard 2016), and in the UK and Australia automatic
enrollment and autoescalation have been introduced.
Matching contributions can also be used to encourage voluntary contribu-
tions to the match threshold. This can be employer contributions in response
to employee contributions, or tax relief for employee contributions which
may be presented as a form of matching (relief from 20 percent tax can be
recast as 1:4 matching, which may be simpler for participants to understand.)
Finally, reducing pre-retirement ‘leakage’ of retirement assets will help
enhance savings rates. This can include ensuring accumulated assets roll
over into a retirement plan on job change rather than being cashed out, and
avoiding early withdrawals. For example, the UK ‘pension freedoms’ abol-
ished annuitization and provided full access to retirement assets from age
55. Early evidence shows a signiﬁcant number of participants taking with-
drawals in their 50s for non-retirement reasons (leisure, home improve-
ment) with relatively little consideration for the impact on longer-term
retirement income (State Street Global Advisors 2016).
Making it easier for people to work for longer. As the calculations above
show, creating a better retirement income system in the face of low returns
will require longer working lives. This means creating incentives for individ-
uals to stay employed (which may mean reskilling or re-engineering job
roles), and moving away from conventional retirement ages.
Another important question is how employers will facilitate and value
older workers. Some ﬁrms already employ them as a source of competitive
advantage: for example, B&Q, a home improvements store chain in the UK,
is known to employ retirees who are able to advise customers with a lifetime
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of experience of household maintenance. Yet other ﬁrms are not ready for
the increasing number of older workers (see Sonsino’s chapter in this
volume). There may also be regulatory barriers such as compulsory retire-
ment ages to be overcome. For example, both Sweden and the UK have
abolished the compulsory retirement age for most positions. Additionally,
policymakers may need to take steps to encourage the hiring of older
workers, e.g. by subsidizing healthcare costs or reducing employment
protections.
Another way to make retirement systems more sustainable is to raise the
retirement age. Yet a uniform increase in the minimum retirement age risks
may be seen as unfair to low earners who have lower average life expectan-
cies and likely to be employed in jobs where extending the work life is
challenging (Belbase et al. 2016). Many low earners also start their working
careers earlier than those with higher levels of education, so asking everyone
to extend their working lives could be seen as inequitable (Sanzenbacher
et al. 2015). One answer might be to link the minimum eligibility for
retirement beneﬁts to years of work rather than age; as many low earners
start work earlier than their college-educated contemporaries, the former
would then qualify for retirement beneﬁts at a younger age. Such an
approach was considered by a recent UK review of state pension age
(Cridland 2016), though no recommendation or policy change to that
effect has been made as yet.
Conclusions
Increasing longevity and low expected returns confront today’s workers with
a more challenging environment in retirement saving than previous gener-
ations. Yet, if they save systematically throughout their careers and extend
their working lives to age 70, a 10-percent contribution rate should be
sufﬁcient for most wage earners to achieve a reasonable replacement rate
in retirement. Those aiming to retire earlier will obviously need to contrib-
ute more.
When considering appropriate contribution rates and retirement ages, it
is necessary to take into account life expectancy differentials and the pro-
gressive replacement rate structure of state entitlements. Two implications
for policymakers are relevant. First, rather than linking a right to receive the
state pension to a uniform minimum age, one could link it to a minimum
number of years of contributions. Second, those on very low incomes can
achieve a reasonable replacement rate in retirement with savings rates
in the low single digits, whereas those on higher incomes will require
12–15 percent saving rates. Policymakers considering introducing auto-
enrollment regimes should think carefully about how high to set the default
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enrollment rates, because setting too high a rate may cause low earners to
opt out. Yet a rate appropriate for low earners will be too low for those in
higher wage groups. One possibility could be to have different auto-
enrollment rates for different income cohorts.
For those who have started saving for retirement late, deferring retire-
ment is an extremely powerful tool for improving retirement readiness. Not
only does it shorten the time in retirement and increase the period of
contributions and investment returns, it also signiﬁcantly increases the
income that participants can expect from social security. Participants who
do not start saving until later in their working lives should plan to work until
at least age 70.
Removing the maximum age for claiming social security beneﬁts would
likely beneﬁt high earners the most, while providing lump sum incentives to
defer claiming beneﬁts could be more effective in encouraging low-income
earners to delay retirement. While this analysis has focused mainly on
retirement savings and social security claiming behavior, other strategies
are worthy of future research. For instance, housing equity can be used to
support retirement income. Our discussion has also ignored other strategies
that could be used to boost investment returns (e.g. additional diversiﬁca-
tion or investing in illiquid assets) or to increase sustainable withdrawal rates
(such as full or partial annuitization). Other chapters in this volume take
these up (see Ilmanen and Rauseo; and Fichtner and Seligman).
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